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In “the constitutional case of the century,” the U.K. Supreme Court concluded that the Government did not
possess the prerogative power to withdraw from the European Union.1 However, while it may be clear from the
decision that legislation was required to empower the Government to notify the European Union of its intention
to leave, the scope of the Court’s reasoning in Miller is otherwise uncertain.2 At its broadest, the decision would
apply to the withdrawal from any treaty that had created rights for individuals, regardless of whether such a treaty
had been implemented into domestic law or not. At its narrowest, it only applies to the EU Treaties, which created
a set of arrangements in international law that are so esoteric, they are unique to the European Union. To dem-
onstrate howone judgment can generate such a range of interpretations, this essay unravels the different strands of
argument running through the decision and considers the criticisms leveled by scholars. It will argue that whether
U.K. law requires legislation to withdraw from a treaty depends upon the extent to which that treaty creates rights
in domestic law, the constitutional importance of the legislation incorporating the treaty into U.K. law, and the
circumstances in which a legal challenge to the use of the prerogative arises. Miller provides no general answer,
merely a series of questions.
A Tale of Two Spheres
The U.K. government enjoys a broad prerogative power of foreign affairs. AsMiller conﬁrmed, this includes the
power to enter into and withdraw from international treaties.3 However, this does not grant the executive carte
blanche to exercise its power free from legal oversight. All prerogative powers are limited by common law and
by legislation. In particular, “it is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that, unless primary legislation
permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable ministers to change statute law or common law.”4 Moreover,
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“ministers cannot frustrate the purpose of a statute or a statutory provision, for example by emptying it of content
or preventing its effectual operation.”5
As withdrawal from the EU Treaties would alter the law, frustrate the purpose of the European Communities
Act of 1972, and remove private rights incorporated into domestic law,6 the prerogative power to withdraw from
treaties did not include the power to withdraw from the European Union. Such a prerogative power would only
exist if there were clear indications in the 1972 Act that the executive retained the prerogative power to withdraw
from the European Union, even though doing so would alter domestic rights. However, the Act could not be
interpreted in this manner.7 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that withdrawing from the European
Union would give rise to a “fundamental legal change,” amounting to a loss of a source of law.8 Such a “major
change to UK constitutional arrangements cannot be achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only
way that the UK constitution recognizes, namely by Parliamentary legislation.”9
It is important to recognize that the decision inMiller was by no means clear cut. The United Kingdom follows
a dualist approach to international law. While the U.K. executive can exercise prerogative powers to enter into and
withdraw from international law obligations, these obligations do not create rights and obligations in domestic law
unless and until they are incorporated into domestic law through legislation. This dualism is mirrored by a sep-
aration of powers between the executive and the legislature. As John Finnis argued in a lecture that criticized the
reasoning that was later adopted by the majority inMiller, this means that general restrictions on prerogative pow-
ers do not apply to the prerogative power of foreign affairs.10 The rights and obligations incorporated into U.K.
law through the European Communities Act 1972 were not statutory rights. Rather, they were conditional on an
exercise of the prerogative power. This interpretation was reinforced by the wording of the Act, which incorpo-
rates such rights, liabilities, and obligations as arise “from time to time.”11 Consequently, no domestic rights are
removed by the withdrawal from the EuropeanUnion. Nor is the 1972 Act frustrated. Rather, it continues to serve
its purpose of ensuring that the United Kingdom adheres to its international obligations, which, following with-
drawal from the European Union, have been modiﬁed. This argument was accepted by the minority in the
Supreme Court. How did the majority reach the opposite conclusion and what are the broader consequences
for the restrictions on the prerogative power to withdraw from international treaties?
Dualism Disputed?
Themost expansive interpretation would be to argue that, even if not speciﬁcally expressed in such terms,Miller
can be best understood as an indirect challenge to dualism. Eirik Bjørge argues that the version of dualism pre-
sented above is not a fully accurate account of U.K. law.12 In particular, he argues that earlier case law supports the
claim that unincorporated treaty rights can override provisions of the common law that appear to remove those
rights. Moreover, dualism is not just required by parliamentary sovereignty, but is also concerned with the protec-
tion of individual liberty. Bjørge is careful to point out that there is neither a general principle that unincorporated
5 Id. at 51.
6 Id. at 72–73 and 83.
7 Id. at 88.
8 Id. at 82.
9 Id.
10 John Finnis, Brexit and the Balance of Our Constitution (Sir Thomas More Lecture, Dec. 1, 2016).
11 European Communities Act 1972, c. 68 § 2(2) (U.K.).
12 Eirik Bjørge, Can Unincorporated Treaty Obligations be Part of English Law?, 2017 PUB. L. 571.
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treaties that protect individual rights will override domestic law, nor a general principle that treaties have no effect
in English law unless and until they are incorporated.
This essay is not the place to analyze Bjørge’s reassessment of dualism. Moreover, it is clear, as Bjørge recog-
nizes, thatMiller does not provide any speciﬁc authority for this claim. The majority judgment inMiller contains a
clear account of dualism, recognizing that, while treaties have effect in international law, this effect is not mirrored
in domestic law. Treaties “are not part of UK law and give rise to no legal rights or obligations in domestic law.”13
Legislation is required to incorporated treaties into English law.14 Moreover, this principle is based on parliamen-
tary sovereignty, not on the protection of individual liberties.15 The need to preserve parliamentary sovereignty is
also illustrated through the development of the Ponsonby Convention, now placed on a statutory basis,16 requiring
most treaties to be laid before Parliament prior to ratiﬁcation, allowing for parliamentary oversight. Even more
democratic oversight occurs prior to the ratiﬁcation of some modiﬁcations to the EU Treaties under the provi-
sions of the European Union Act 2011. In short, it is hard to readMiller as anything other than a classic account of
dualism. Moreover, even if dualism is rejected or narrowed in the manner suggested by Bjørge, courts would still
need to interpret each treaty to determine its impact on individual rights in order to assess whether the executive
could withdraw from the treaty by use of the prerogative alone.
What the Prerogative Giveth … the Prerogative Cannot (Normally) Taketh Away
A somewhat narrower interpretation ofMiller recognizes that there is a distinction between using a prerogative
to enter into a treaty, and using it to withdraw from a treaty once legislation has incorporated its provisions into
domestic law. Parliamentary sovereignty allows the executive to enter into treaties because they have no impact on
domestic law. Once incorporated, however, the argument changes. For the executive to withdraw from a treaty
once its rights and obligations have been incorporated into domestic law has a different impact. It could remove
rights and obligations that Parliament had chosen to incorporate into domestic law—an executive act overriding
the will of the legislature. The executive could withdraw from a treaty if it were possible for these rights and obli-
gations to continue to be protected in domestic law as domestic rights following withdrawal. Similarly, if legislation
included a sunset provision that speciﬁed that the legislation would terminate following withdrawal, the executive
could use the prerogative to withdraw from a treaty. The legislature, by implication, has overridden the general
limit on the prerogative power that it cannot be used to alter domestic law. Moreover, the legislature’s will is not
frustrated. The sunset clause expresses the legislature’s will that the rights and obligations the legislation incorpo-
rates are conditional on an exercise of prerogative powers by the executive to enter into and withdraw from treaty
obligations.
There is no clear endorsement in Miller of the principle that the executive cannot leave incorporated treaties
without parliamentary approval. Moreover, to the extent that it is implicitly recognized, it is difﬁcult to discern
whether the same conclusion would be reached for all treaties that have incorporated rights or obligations into
domestic law, or whether this would only apply to some treaties, or whether the real driving force is the wording of
the legislation used to incorporate treaty obligations into domestic law. The majority in Miller recognized that the
European Communities Act 1972 had been used to incorporate a range of rights and obligations into U.K. law.17
Although the Supreme Court did not focus on the removal of rights to the same extent as the Divisional Court, it
13 Miller, [2017] UKSC at 55.
14 Id. at 56.
15 Id. at 57.
16 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, c. 25 § 20 (U.K.).
17 Miller, [2017] UKSC at 62 and 69–72.
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nevertheless endorsed the approach of the Divisional Court and stated that the removal of rights that would occur
following withdrawal from the European Union would have provided an additional justiﬁcation for the need for
legislation.18 This approach also helps to explain the statement of the majority that “[t]here is a vital difference
between changes in domestic law resulting from variations in the content of EU law arising from new EU legis-
lation, and changes in domestic law resulting from withdrawal by the United Kingdom from the European
Union.”19 While the former would have received either direct or indirect democratic support from the legislature
and would modify the content of rights, the latter removes all rights and obligations that had, until the act of the
executive, been approved for incorporation into domestic law by the legislature. This reading would also ﬁt with
the focus in Miller on the protection of parliamentary sovereignty, its approach to dualism, and with broader
approaches in U.K. public law that recognize a difference between granting and removing a right.
However, it is also important to recognize the role that the wording of the European Communities Act 1972
played in the Miller decision, in addition to the sui generis nature of the European Union. The next section will
examine the latter of these two issues. As regards the former, great attention was paid to the ambulatory nature
of the Act, which does not incorporate a speciﬁed list of rights and obligations. Rather, it incorporates rights and
obligations “from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties.”20 It was this wording that dominated the
argument of the Government and the conclusion of the minority, and which has so inﬂuenced the academic crit-
icism of the judgment. The wording was used to argue that the rights and obligations incorporated into U.K. law
were different. Their content was dependent on the U.K.’s membership of the European Union, itself dependent
on the exercise of a prerogative power. These were read as a means of accommodating the variable content of EU
law as this varied over time, ensuring the United Kingdom could comply with its obligations arising from EU
membership whilst retaining its dualist approach to international law.21 While the majority agreed with this inter-
pretation as regards the modiﬁcation of rights through EU Treaty changes, it did not accept the same argument
applied when the prerogative was used to withdraw from the Treaty.
How far can this reasoning be applied to other treaties? Take, for example, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), whose domestic incorporation occurs through the provisions of the Human Rights
Act 1998. The Act requires courts to read and give effect to legislation, so far as it is possible to do so, in a manner
compatible with Convention rights.22 It also establishes that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a manner
that contravenes a Convention right.23 Convention rights are deﬁned in Section 1 of the Act, with Schedule 1
setting out the speciﬁc rights.24 Unlike the position with the European Union, the incorporation of
Convention rights into domestic law was not required for the United Kingdom to fulﬁll its international law obli-
gations under the ECHR. The Act also contains an ambulatory provision, deﬁning the Convention “as it has effect
for the time being” in relation to the United Kingdom.25
The different means of incorporating Convention rights and the lack of a speciﬁc international law obligation to
incorporate such rights into domestic law might mean that, were the executive to use its prerogative powers to
withdraw from the European Union, it would remove domestic rights and frustrate the Act. According to this
18 Id. at 83–84.
19 Id. at 78.
20 European Communities Act 1972, c. 68 § 2(2) (U.K.).
21 Miller, [2017] UKSC at 79.
22 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 § 3 (U.K.).
23 Id. at § 6.
24 Id. at schedule 1.
25 Id. at § 21.
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view, Convention rights would not be understood as dependent upon an exercise of the prerogative. Alternatively,
the deﬁnition of Convention rights as those binding the UnitedKingdom “as it has effect for the time being”might
mean that Convention rights should be understood as conditional upon the exercise of a prerogative power. Is the
purpose of the Human Rights Act emptied, its purpose being to uphold international obligations the United
Kingdom no longer has, or does the Act provide a domestic protection of Convention rights that would carry
on even after withdrawal from the ECHR?26
Esoterically Unique European Union
A further argument inﬂuencing the majority was the unique nature of the European Union and of EU law. It is
hard to deny that the European Union differs from other international organizations. As Miller recognizes, the
United Kingdom accepted, through the enactment of the 1972 Act as interpreted through later case law, that
domestic law which contradicts directly effective provisions of EU law can be “disapplied.”27 Miller also recog-
nized EU law as a new source of law, its provisions incorporated into U.K. law through the conduit pipe of the
1972 Act.28 The EU Treaties and their means of implementation into U.K. law “were and are unique in their leg-
islative and constitutional implications.”29 They grafted directly effective EU law “onto and above”30 domestic law
and, as such, “it seems most improbable that those two parties had the intention or expectation that ministers,
constitutionally the junior partner in that exercise, could subsequently remove the graft without formal appropriate
sanction from the constitutionally senior partner in that exercise, Parliament.”31
These statements raise more questions than they answer. Is the “major change” to the U.K. Constitution the
removal of a source of law, the removal of a source of law that can disapply domestic law, or the removal of so
many rights and obligations in one go? Is it because of the “constitutional nature” of the European Communities
Act 1972?32 If so, does this mean that treaties such as the ECHR or the Belfast Agreement cannot be removed by
the prerogative alone given their constitutional importance? Or is this not the case for the Belfast Agreement,
which is not speciﬁcally designed to create individual rights? Or is neither of those treaties of sufﬁcient constitu-
tional importance, given that these treaties do not provide for the creation of a new source of law, let alone one that
can displace domestic law?
Conclusion
Miller may be understood as a straightforward answer to a simple question: legislation is needed to withdraw
from the European Union. However, the different strands of reasoning that intertwine through the judgment
mean that it is very difﬁcult to predict the extent to which future treaty withdrawals may be achieved through
an exercise of prerogative power by the executive without legislative authority. To add to the complexities, we
26 See Alex Peplow,Withdrawal from the ECHR After Miller—AMatter of Prerogative?, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2017); Jack Williams,
Miller and the Human Rights Act 1998: Can the Government Withdraw the UK from the ECHR by the Royal Prerogative?, PUB. SECTOR BLOG (Feb. 28,
2017); andGavin Phillipson &Alison L. Young,Would Use of the Prerogative to Denounce the ECHR “Frustrate” the Human Rights Act? Lessons from
Miller, 2017 PUB. L. 150.
27 Miller, [2017] UKSC at (Brexit Special Extra Edition) 60–61.
28 Id. at 80–81.
29 Id. at 90.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 67.
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also need to be acutely aware of the context in which theMiller case was decided. The applicant was challenging a
position taken by the Government on how it would leave the European Union in the future, rather than challeng-
ing a speciﬁc use of the prerogative. Article 50 triggers withdrawal, but it is not clear what rights will be lost, this
being dependent upon negotiations on the withdrawal agreement. Nor was it clear at that time how far Parliament
would have a say in future negotiations or the modiﬁcations to domestic law that would then ensue. The Supreme
Court’s decision is more akin to abstract constitutional review. This may explain the lack of certainty. It may also
emphasize a deeper point. Context—particularly constitutional—is everything.
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